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BOOK REVIEW
As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMiR CREDIT
IN AMERICA. By Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and Jay
Lawrence Westbrook. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
pp. xii, 370. $29.95.
Reviewed by Michael J. Herbert*
Bankruptcy may soon join death and taxes as an inevitable con-
sequence of human life. During the year ending June 30, 1988, (the
most recent year for which there are conveniently available figures)
594,567 American individuals and companies filed for bankruptcy.1
There is more than a sporting chance that, come the next reces-
sion, bankruptcies will top one million per year. Good news for
lawyers, if not the economy.
It already appears that bankruptcy is by far the most common
form of litigation. Why? Explanations range from the muted and
mundane to the apoplectic and apocalyptic; they run the full
gamut of contemporary political and economic belief. Maybe it's
all just lawyer advertising. Or it might be the inevitable effects of
economic decay in an overstretched imperial power. Or it could be
all due to a swarm of lazy, deadly deadbeats who epitomize the loss
of moral fibre in a permissive society.
The proliferation of bankruptcy proceedings has brought with it
a welcome explosion in bankruptcy scholarship. For decades, the
legal profession produced relatively little bankruptcy theory be-
yond Charles Warren's admirable but somewhat limited 1935
study.2 A trickle of serious work in the 1960's has led to a torrent
of diverse and challenging studies of the function and purpose of
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1974,
John Carroll University; J.D., 1977, University of Michigan.
1. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 879 (1990).
2. C. WARREN, BANKRPTcY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935).
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bankruptcy. And, unlike so much academic legal work, these stud-
ies have had, and are having, a significant impact on the day-to-
day practice of lawyers. Much of the bankruptcy theory churned
out in a search for tenure or ivory-tower status has been seriously
considered by Congress and the courts in the development of
bankruptcy law. In part, this is because much of the work done
during the last twenty years or so has moved from the laboratory
of the law school library to the laboratory of the bankruptcy court.
A number of "empirical" studies have concentrated not on the re-
ported cases and the Bankruptcy Code, but on the wealth of infor-
mation about real bankrupts contained in the files of real bank-
ruptcy cases. An unconnected group of scholars has devised a fairly
uniform and highly useful methodology, one which has released
them from the limitations of studying only the traditional legal
data contained in cases and statutes. They have more-or-less sys-
tematically compiled raw data from bankruptcy files and converted
that data into analyses of bankruptcy law.' Who are the people
who wind up in bankruptcy court? What happens to them? This is
a new model of legal research which holds out the promise of nar-
rowing the gap between academic and practical lawyering.
The most extensive and most sophisticated study of bankruptcy
files has now been completed. It was begun about a decade ago by
two law professors (Elizabeth Warren, then of the University of
Texas, now of the University of Pennsylvania, and Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Andrews & Kurth Professor of Law at the University
of Texas) and one sociologist (Teresa A. Sullivan, Professor of So-
ciology and Law at the University of Texas). It has culminated in a
book which is destined to become a true classic of legal scholar-
ship, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer
Credit in America.4 As is true with any classic, it will be both (de-
servedly) admired and (somewhat less deservedly) excoriated.
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook began with a mission. They
sought to discredit a theory of bankruptcy law which had become
popular among creditors at least. This theory held that individual
debtors are extremely sensitive toward changes in debtor/creditor
3. For a couple of examples, see Herbert & Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia:
The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984-87,
22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303 (1988); Schuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and
Analysis of 753 Personal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 88 CoM. L.J. 288 (1983).
4. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989) [hereinafter DEBTORS].
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law, and are thus very quick to change their own behavior in re-
sponse to changes that are favorable or unfavorable to their inter-
ests. For example, suppose that a state changes its exemption law
to increase the amount of property which a debtor can protect
from creditors in bankruptcy from $5,000 to $10,000. If debtors
carefully weigh the advantages of bankruptcy-if they view it as an
investment, not an embarrassment-the number of bankruptcies
should increase as debtors seek to take advantage of the increased
exemptions.
Of course, no one seriously questions that gross changes in debt-
ors' rights will change debtor behavior. If exemptions were in-
creased from $5,000 to $10,000,000, there would no doubt be an
increase in bankruptcies. Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook, how-
ever, challenge the assertion that debtors react predictably to rela-
tively minor changes in the law; they reject the notion that the law
can be fine-tuned to produce an optimal number of bankruptcies.
They particularly had in their sights a study produced (at the be-
hest of creditors) at Purdue University; that study purported to
prove that over one billion dollars per year was uselessly dis-
charged in bankruptcy proceedings.
The Purdue study represented part of a backlash against the
1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. That act "liberalized" bankruptcy
law and, in the view of many, virtually invited debtors into dead-
beat heaven.7 Indeed, the Act stopped calling bankrupts "bank-
rupts" and started calling them "debtors," because Congress was
concerned that the word "bankrupt" hurt people's feelings.8 To
many, this solicitude for the emotional well-being of the non-pay-
ing customer symbolized everything that was wrong with the Act.
The Purdue study certainly influenced Congress which, in 1984,
reined in the perceived excesses of the 1978 law. The 1984 law,
which was in large measure the residue of an attempted counter-
coup by the credit industry, limited the availability of discharge in
consumer bankruptcy proceedings. Certain consumer debtors were
forced either to forgo bankruptcy discharge entirely, or to take the
relatively hard road of paying to their creditors all their disposable
5. More properly known as Credit Research Center, Krannert School of Management,
Purdue University, Monograph Nos. 23 and 24, Consumer Bankruptcy Study (1982).
6. DEBTORS, supra note 4, at 5-7.
7. See Black & Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A Critique of the 1984 Consumer Credit
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 845, 845-46 (1985).
8. Id. at 851 n. 27.
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income for a three-year period.9 Although these changes affected
very few actual bankruptcies, they appeared to many to be the
creditors' opening wedge. There was great concern that bankruptcy
discharge might soon be broadly denied to consumer debtors on
very dubious grounds. The belief of some, that many consumer
bankrupts had more than enough income to pay their debts and
were thus improperly manipulating bankruptcy, seemed to have
become a truism.
The Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook team began with a bril-
liant attack on the Purdue study, which they viewed, and view, as
a hopelessly flawed bit of bought research.10 They were by no
means alone in their contempt for that work. Many other empirical
studies suggested that bankruptcy abuse was not particularly wide-
spread." The General Accounting Office weighed in with a fine
study of "pre-1978" and "post-1978" bankruptcies which indicated
that the allegedly pro-debtor bias of the 1978 law had made little,
if any, difference.' 2 Congress resisted the most extreme demands
for limitation of bankruptcy discharge and, in fact, in 1986 enacted
a very generous set of bankruptcy rules for family farmers.' 3
To this extent, at least, As We Forgive Our Debtors is rather a
day late (though not by any means a dollar short). The argument
its authors set out to make has, in the short term at least, largely
been resolved in their favor. This only diminishes the immediate
political value of the book, however. The struggle over the proper
scope of bankruptcy discharge-which dates back to the very in-
ception of the bankruptcy laws-will surely recur.
The book's theses are simple. First, bankrupts are not a distinc-
tive class of Americans; they are, by and large, a random cross-
section of our society, distinctive only in that they make less
money and have more debt than the rest of us. Second, bankruptcy
"abuse," although not unknown, is rare-too rare to justify major
reformulation of bankruptcy law. Third, bankruptcy law is not an
efficient means of shaping human behavior; people do not respond
9. Id. at 852-61.
10. Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analy-
sis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1091.
11. See Black & Herbert, supra note 7, at 849 n. 18; Herbert and Pacitti, supra note 3, at
303 n. 1.
12. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978-A Before and After Look GAO/GGD-83-54 (July 20, 1983).
13. See Herbert, Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends: The 1986 Reforms of the
Reformed Bankruptcy Reform Act, 16 CAP. U.L. REv. 325 (1987).
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to incremental changes in their insolvency rights. But perhaps
even more significantly, the book undermines a great many trea-
sured bankruptcy cliches. Much of the folklore that is commonly
believed about those who seek bankruptcy relief is called seriously
into question.
The empirical data for the book was drawn from 1,529 case files.
All of the cases were filed in 1981. The files were selected from ten
districts-three each in Illinois and Pennsylvania, four in Texas. 14
Because bankruptcy filing required detailed financial statements
concerning assets, debts, occupations and income, these files gave
at least something of a portrait of the average bankrupt and the
average bankruptcy.
The core of the book is chapters 4 and 5, in which the authors'
dissect their data on the financial profile and occupations of their
bankrupts. Many of the findings are, to say the least, surprising.
The number of bankrupts who were unemployed was not terribly
high. Somewhere between 7% and 17% of the bankrupts had no
employment at the time they filed; this was at a time when the
unemployment rates in the three states ranged from 5.3% in Texas
to 8.4% in Pennsylvania. 5 The jobs of the employed bankrupts
covered the whole range of occupations in roughly the same pro-
portions as the whole population. Bankrupts were only slightly
more likely than other people to hold low-status occupations.'6 In
short, bankrupt America is essentially middle America-it is not
the underclass.
About one-fourth of the bankrupts in the sample had suffered a
sharp drop in income during the two years before their filings. This
hardly surprising statistic, however, is more than balanced by the
fact that over half the bankrupts had gains-usually sharp
gains-in income during the two years before their filings. This is
not to say that those bankrupts got rich; indeed, the incomes of
the income-gaining bankrupts remained far below the national av-
erage. 7 The study also revealed that bankrupts generally have
substantially lower-than-average incomes when compared to the
general population and to people in the same occupations. 8 The
most striking difference between bankrupts and non-bankrupts is
14. DEBTORS, supra note 4, at 17-18.
15. Id. at 85-86.
16. Id. at 86-95.
17. Id. at 98-99.
18. Id. at 64-66, 91-95.
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that their debt to income ratios are markedly higher than normal.19
Bankrupts are almost as likely as the rest of the population to
own their own homes. 20 Bankrupts are not particularly likely to
have had recent major medical expenses.2 Relatively few bank-
rupts have been the target of foreclosures or other formal collec-
tion processes. 22 Bankrupts, however, do tend to have very large
amounts of credit card debt.23
To summarize: the findings are that the community of bank-
rupts is in most respects a microcosm of the entire community.
Only two clear differences are noted. First, reported income is only
about two-thirds that of the general population. Second, debt/in-
come ratios are very high.24
From these somewhat discordant facts, the authors crafted their
central thesis about the cause of bankruptcy. In their view the
most likely explanation is that bankrupts are much more likely
than the rest of the population to have suffered recent substantial
interruption in income. Although they admit that they cannot
prove this, they argue that the key determinant of bankruptcy is a
sharp, if temporary, loss of earnings. That, they say, is what most
frequently tips a marginal household economy into a failed one.26
It is certainly not an implausible theory. Take, for example, a
family of four with an income of $30,000 per year. They own two
old cars, a modest home, and at least one Nintendo. Like most
Americans they save very little; the monthly income is just more
than enough to pay all the bills. Because of a layoff, the family
income drops to $6,000 for 10 months. What might happen?
In Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook's reconstruction, many
things may happen. The family may begin to live off their credit
cards, especially because credit card credit is so easy to obtain.2 6
This would explain the high amount of such debt in the balance
sheet. Creditors would not be over-eager to sue them, because the
cost of litigation might overwhelm the meager assets that creditors
could hope to recover. Although there would certainly be a period
19. Id. at 73-76.
20. Id. at 129.
21. Id. at 168-69.
22. Id. at 305.
23. Id. at 183-84.
24. Id. at 64-66, 73-76, 91-95, 328-33.
25. Id. at 95-102.
26. Id. at 187-88, 316-17.
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of time during which the family would have to face nasty letters
and phone calls from creditors, those letters and calls would gradu-
ally fade away as the creditors realized that there would be no
repayment.1
7
Then, when the family's income rose back to, say, $22,000, hun-
gry creditors would again pick up the scent. Now there would be
something to latch on to. This renewed pressure would finally lead
our exhausted debtors to file bankruptcy. This helps explain why
so many bankrupts had low overall income and very high debts,
yet reported an increase in 'income shortly before the filing.28
The preceding synopsis is of course a considerable simplification
of the book's discussion, which is far more nuanced. It does, how-
ever, represent the authors' core explanation for the profile of the
typical bankrupt. It is not the only explanation. Almost everything
reported by Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook is consistent with the
thesis that bankrupts are, on average, more careless about financial
matters than the rest of the population. They can be viewed as a
class of people who stretch their spending to the absolute limit of
the most optimistic appraisal of their income prospects. They do
not budget for normal fluctuations in income; and when those fluc-
tuations occur, their financial house of credit cards collapses.
Chapters 10 through 13 of the book are a sustained attack upon
the belief that a great number of consumer bankrupts have the
capacity to pay their bills, and thus should be forced to do so. One
of the major proposals for squeezing back the alleged generosity of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Act was that Chapter 13-the main consumer
reorganization chapter-should be made mandatory for many con-
sumer bankrupts.29 The theory was that many consumers had
enough income to pay all, or a substantial part, of their debts if
they were forced to live modestly for the three year period of a
Chapter 13 plan. The 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
included only a few fragments of this proposal; by and large, Con-
gress rejected the whole notion of a mandatory Chapter 13.30
The book asserts that only about 10% of the studied bankrupts
27. Id. at 100-01.
28. Id. at 101.
29. See Black & Herbert, supra note 7, at 845-52.
30. For a general discussion of these issues, see Corish & Herbert, The Debtor's Dilemma:
Disposable Income as the Cost of Chapter 13 Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 47 LA. L.
REv. 47 (1986).
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show any prospect of being able to repay debts from future in-
come, and argue that this is too small a group to justify the ex-
pense involved in identifying them.3 1 Of course, to some degree
this argument is self-proving. The key issue underlying the ques-
tion of bankrupts' ability to pay is what level of economic well-
being are we willing to let bankrupts enjoy? If, as a society, we
were willing to say that the price of bankruptcy discharge is three
years' worth of the barest subsistence, a great deal of money might
be sweated out. There are many problems with this, not the least
of which is that a bankrupt who is reduced to such a level of pov-
erty no longer has any incentive to go to work and earn the money
that the creditors so badly want.
There is also other evidence, in the book and elsewhere, that
forced repayment is a doomed hope. Chapter 13, which was
designed to entice consumer bankrupts into making voluntary ef-
forts to repay debt, has been far less successful than its drafters
hoped. The vast majority of Chapter 13 repayment plans fail.32
This means that most bankrupts who do in fact attempt repay-
ment will be unable to do so. No doubt the failure rate of involun-
tary Chapter 13 plans would be even higher.
Another creditor whine is that many debtors overuse credit
cards on the eve of bankruptcy. Horror stories are told of last min-
ute binges, courtesy the debtor's bankcard, just before filing-a
sort of economic Mardi Gras before the grim Lent imposed by the
bankruptcy court. Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook find little evi-
dence of this.3 In any event, this is a problem for which creditors
have already been given some statutory relief; the debts created by
those binges are now non-dischargeable in Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.3 4
The book also studies bankruptcy recidivism. If many of the
complaints of creditor groups are true, we should find a substantial
number of people who repeatedly use bankruptcy. Chapter 7 (liq-
uidation bankruptcy) discharge is available every seventh year.3 5
That should be just about enough time for the average crafty dead-
beat to run up another string of debts and thus to make another
dash to the bankruptcy court. Yet Sullivan, Warren and West-
31. DEBTORS, supra note 4, at 212-13.
32. Id. at 213-17.
33. Id. at 178-89.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 523(2)(C) (1988).
35. Id. § 727(a)(8).
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brook find little evidence of this in their files. Only about 8% of
their debtors had previously been in bankruptcy.36 Moreover, the
authors contend that only about a third of that 8% are "true re-
peaters"-which they define as persons who obtain a discharge,
run up a new set of debts, and then file for bankruptcy. They con-
trast this group with a larger group which managed to pay off at
least one set of debts between Chapter 7 discharges.37
Finally, the authors launch an attack squarely at the assumption
which underlies the push for the 1984 amendments-the notion
that the market for bankruptcy is efficient. They present a strong
case for the proposition that incremental changes in bankruptcy
laws do not achieve significant changes in the behavior of bank-
rupts.38 Bankrupts are not obsessive wealth maximizers; they do
not respond swiftly or in great numbers to the loosening or tight-
ening of the standards for discharge. And the well-off-whose po-
tential bankruptcy gains are the greatest--do not much use it:
These numbers show a clear economic sorting so obvious it is easy to
overlook: People in financial trouble are the people entering bank-
ruptcy. Those not in bankruptcy are, on average, much better off
financially. At the grossest level, economic sorting works impres-
sively; it simply does not work according to a simplistic economic
model.
The proponents of the economic model used in debating bank-
ruptcy policy assumed this basic sorting would not work, that rich
and poor alike would use bankruptcy, making more powerful eco-
nomic restrictions necessary. According to a purely economic view,
bankruptcy without severe limitations is so attractive that debtors
should "enrich" themselves by discharging their debts even if they
could pay.... In fact, most debtors avoid bankruptcy until they
reach an economic crisis, suggesting that bankruptcy seems more at-
tractive to economists than to debtors.3 9
This bit of good sense will win some bitter enemies for the book.
There is a lot of very silly economics on the loose these days, espe-
cially among the less intellectually adept members of the law-and-
economics movement. A depressingly large amount of economic
writing is based on an inane model of human behavior that is so
36. DEBTORS, supra note 4, at 192.
37. Id. at 192-95.
38. Id. at 230-63.
39. Id. at 243.
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absurdly simplistic only academics (and perhaps one or two federal
judges) are capable of taking it seriously.. Yet for some the model
has quasi-religious overtones, which render their devotion to it im-
mune to facts. For them, As We Forgive Our Debtors is the moral
equivalent of The Satanic Verses.
The final substantive chapters of the book deal with the plight
of the "other players" in the bankruptcy drama-the creditors.
These chapters are, as one would expect given the focus of the
study, the weakest in the book. The authors are more than a bit
prudish about lax-lending practices. They are clearly puzzled by
the actions of many creditors in offering so much credit on such
easy terms:
Not only are 60-month car loans on the rise, but so too are three-
and four-year unsecured loans solicited on a mass basis. The credi-
tors who are making these loans are as bound for bankruptcy court
as if they had asked to be included. The explanation must be as
simple as profit and loss, a fact confirmed by an industry analyst
who was recently quoted as saying that credit card issuers are so
sure that they will suffer high losses from a mass mailing of cards,
they charge the resulting unpaid loans to "marketing expense"
rather than to bad debt losses.40
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook are particularly bemused by the
failure of many consumer lenders to make any significant investi-
gation of a borrower's real credit worthiness, 41 or to obtain collat-
eral.42 The latter is perhaps especially surprising, since heavily se-
cured creditors have an excellent chance of receiving full or at least
substantial payment in bankruptcy.
All of this merely reinforces the book's conclusions. In the clos-
ing chapter, the authors' basic assertions are that the current sys-
tem works quite well, that no system could do a fundamentally
better job, and that many of the problems of creditors occur be-
cause of choices they have made and business risks they have vol-
untarily accepted. 43 They also argue that bankruptcy in America
takes the place of a European-style safety net of comprehensive
benefits.44 Finally, they make a last spirited attack on the law-and-
40. Id. at 323.
41. Id. at 312-19.
42. Id. at 311-12.
43. Id. at 328-33.
44. Id. at 333-35.
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economics crowd, whom they chide for promulgating vacuous
"armchair theories" based on little real data.45
Many criticisms of this book are obvious, and no doubt will be
forcefully made. The authors are arguing from a thesis; they went
into the project with a mission, and they accomplished that mis-
sion. They are honest enough to admit this, and seem at times to
have tried to counteract their own biases. This, if nothing else, dis-
tinguishes them from many theorists who assume their biases have
the imprimatur of divine truth and thus would never consider at-
tempting to neutralize them. But the biases are there, and they
color the whole work.
As noted above, one of the authors' central arguments-that
bankrupts are ordinary people who have suffered a sudden loss of
income-is unproven. It is, however, convenient to their biases,
and thus must be held suspect by the critical reader. It may well
be (as the authors have the disarming grace to admit) that their
sample consisted largely of people who were incompetent or
lazy-whose loss of income was simply the result of the feckless-
ness that led to their bankruptcy. The fact that illness-one of the
assumed root causes of economic failure by consumers-appeared
to be a minor factor in triggering bankruptcy at least suggests that
many debtors may have had no "good" (read: socially acceptable)
reason for the sudden financial collapse. And nothing in their
study fully explains the fact that a slight majority of debtors ex-
perienced a significant increase in income in the period just before
bankruptcy.
The book is filled with reconstructions of the lives of individual
debtors.46 These anecdotal bits make good reading but perhaps less
effective scholarship. No doubt the abstractions of the law are a
barrier to understanding; and bankruptcy analysis which does not
take into account the fact that there is pain in failure is incom-
plete.47 Of bankrupts, of all persons, it is true that "[p]erhaps their
lives have no cosmic significance, but they have feelings. They can
hurt. ' 48 But the book's reconstructions are rather arbitrary novel-
45. Id. at 335-38.
46. See, e.g., id. at 50-60.
47. Interestingly, one critique of DEBToRs seems to take the authors to task for putting
too little anecdotal information in the book. See Gross, Book Review, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1506
(1990) reviewing T. SULLIvAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROo, As WE FORGIVE OuR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTcY AND CONSUMER CREDrr IN AMERICA (1989).
48. R. HEINLEIN, DOUBLE STAR 243 (1986).
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izations of the known facts. We do not know these debtors, we
know only what the authors imagine; and what they imagine may
be entirely misleading.
The authors are also, of necessity, forced to rely on self-reported
information. The bankruptcy courts do not verify the information
contained in the schedules filed by the bankrupts. In consequence,
those schedules are no more accurate than the debtor's memory
and honesty will permit. No doubt at least some are largely ficti-
tious. This does not mean that there is systematic misreporting;
there is every reason to believe that most of the schedules are re-
markably accurate. However, the very people who are improperly
manipulating the bankruptcy system are at the same time the peo-
ple who are most likely to lie when they fill out their schedules.
Thus, the number of cases in which the files reveal misconduct or
abuse is almost certainly understated.
One of the painful aspects of any research is that some precon-
ceptions will inevitably be destroyed. Clearly, this happened to
Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook. They are honest enough to admit
it. They are committed enough to attempt plausible but unprov-
able explanations for much of their unexpected data. This perhaps
demonstrates nothing but what every seasoned lawyer knows: the
easy questions are obvious. The hard questions-which are really
the heart of law-can never be fully resolved. Persons of intelli-
gence and good will can look at exactly the same data; and where
one sees deadbeats, the other sees despair.
Keep these caveats in mind-but read the book. It provides a
better understanding of real bankruptcy than does anything else
published by any other academic. The data is presented for the
most part in a manner which is honest enough to permit the reader
to reach his or her own conclusions. The book is astonishingly well
written in a crisp prose style, and the flow of text is for the most
part enhanced, rather than burdened, with the numbers and the
formulae.4 9 It sets an example for legal scholarship which has
rarely been, and will rarely be, met.
49. Those who are not mathematically inclined can in fact skip all the numbers without
losing the thread of the argument.
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